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Winds of Change
After Modernity

R~dney Clapp has recently identified Winnie-the-Pooh as a prelllter philosopher in the West. He writes:
A noted Wes tern philosopher, introduced to the world in 1926,
Was one day s itting on a log when he heard a bu zzi ng sound . He
Was puzzled a nd fe ll to pondering. As hi s leadi ng chronicl er
rerne n1bers the event, the p hil oso pher reasoned a long th e follow ing lines:
"'If

there's a bu zz ing-noise, somebody's making a buzzing noise,
a nd the only reason for making a buzzin g-noise tha t I know of is
because you're a bee.'
Then he thought another long time a nd sa id : 'And the only reason For being a bee that I know of is m a king honey.'
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And then he got up and said : 'And the only reason for making
honey is so I can eat it."' 1

Who can resist snickering at Pooh-bear's gleeful and
unashamed preoccupation with his tummy? Yet, the reasoning
process by which Pooh concludes that "bees are for me," epitomizes a widely accepted 300-year-old philosophical project. This
project is the invisible backdrop to most of our contemporary
preoccupations. Since the mid-seventeenth century, modern
philosophy has advocated three doctrines. 2 First, the individual
is always prior to and more significant than any larger group of
which he or she is a part. According to this doctrine, sometimes
called generic individuali m, a believing community is incidental to, and really nothing but, the sum of the individual members. The real action takes place at the level of the individual
who must choose his or her master, mate, and mission. Such
decisions are taken to be the prerequisites for voluntary association with like-minded others.
A second modern doctrine holds that language is nothing but
a picture of the world. Just as a Polaroid snapshot of my room
does not rearrange the furniture, language is thought to be a
neutral depiction of the way the world is. This reductive theory
about language is called representationalism. According to representationalism, words and sentences are expendable bearers
of more important things called meanings. In this view, truthfulness is measured in terms of a sentence's correspondence
with the ways things really are.
It is claimed, third, that beliefs are nothing but assertions
about the way things really are. This theory is sometimes called
proposilio11.alism. In this view, beliefs always can be, and ought
to be, subject to rigoro us testing. Those beliefs that pass the
scrutiny of publicly accessible criteria qualify for the supreme
status of "knowledge." However, strictly speaking, only in regard
to logic and mathematics can the entence "I know" be voiced
truthfully-that is, with absolute certa inty.
What could be more obvious?
Obvious for whom? Anything that strikes Pooh as obvious
deserves a second look. Surprisingly, these three dogmas of
modernity are themselves guilty of reductionism, the over simplification of complexities about selfhood, language, and faith.
16
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These dogmas were not the achievement of millennia of searching after philosophical clarity. Rather, they were the emotional
crutch of an age terrified by a world that was falling apart,3 and
recent philosophers have begun to migrate away [Tom the conceptual space defined by these three doctrines of modernity.
Rather than spend time trying to make clear the modern views
0
.f metaphysics, language, or epistemology, by telling some stones I will try to give yo u some inkling of the sorts of directions
lll wh ich contemporary postcritical or postmodern philosophy
may be moving. 4 Once I clarify a lternative ways for thinking
~bout the world, I will make some suggestions as to what evangehsm might look like in a post-Pooh age.

Challenging Individualism
· According to the received account, conglom erates in the
Physical world are necessarily nothing more than the sums of
their parts. For example, molecules are nothing more than the
sum of their respective atoms; human persons are nothing more
than the collection of their cells; communities are nothing more
than the aggregation of their members, and so on.
On this old-and what we are calling here the modern-view,
the really real and that which does all the causal work in any ystem are the smallest identifiable parts. Of course, this makes
Physics th e premier scientific discipline because the direction
of causation is assumed to move h·om parts to wholes, but not
th
e other way around, and phy ics, after all , studies the smallest parts.
be Yet. if_that were true,. then we o ug.h t to ~e ~b!e predict the
. havtor of any group simply by lookmg at mdtviduals. Unfortunately, this simply is not the case. 5 In fact, groups fTequently
take on a life of their own and act corporately as if the group
~ere its own sort of entity. For example, imagine a herd of wild
oars fleeing single-file through dense vegetation with a predat~r at th eir heels. Just as the predator is close enough to nibble
1
t e haunches of the last boar in the line something amazing hapPens. The pack splits, some running left, others running right,
and as if on cue the entire herd turns to face the now-surrounded
17
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predator. How does each boar fleeing for its life manage to act
in unison with the rest of the herd?
Or consider another puzzling story. The Hollywood hit Jurassic Parle made famous the biological phenomenon that some
species of African frogs have the ability to spontaneously change
their gender in order to equilibrate a population in which one
gender has disappeared. Let's say all the females have been
removed. How is each male (Tog to know the dif-ference between
being continuously unlucky at getting a date for Saturday and
the more serious condition (serious enough for him to change
gender!) of there being no females at all in the community?
Consider a third example. We are all familiar with the ability
of a school of fish to move in unified reaction to our tapping on
the side of the aquarium. It might be hypothesized that unified
movement is not a group behavior, but simply an accident: each
individual fish is similar enough to the others to respond identically to the same external stimuli. If we managed to put tiny
blindfolds on the fish and witnessed the same group behavior
after tapping the glass, I suspect that we would be undaunted,
for it is conceivable that the fish, each nearly identical to its
neighbor, might be capable of responding to the sound or even
to the vibration of our tapping. Of course this explanation only
works if each fish possesses the faculty necessary for responding to sight, sound, or whatever. The real surprise would be if
the school still swam in unison after, in addition to blindfolding them, we stopped their ears and scooped out their brains.
And yet this is analogous to the Benard phenomenon. 6 If a cylinder of liquid is heated from below, the blind, deaf, and witless
molecules of the liquid spontaneously form hexagonal "cells" of
convection as if an invisible honeycomb had been slipped into
the container. Within each cell molecules move in a uniform
way while molecules in a neighboring cell move in a different
pattern that is uniform for that cell. How does any given molecule "know" to which cell it belongs?
What are we to make of these mysteries? Should we cone] ude
that there must be a way to explain these group phenomena
entirely in terms of the individuals because, after all, groups are
nothing but the sum of their individual members? Some contemporary thinkers beg to differ; group behavior cannot be
described in terms of individuals precisely because the group is
18
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more than the aggregation of its members. Something real
emerges at the level of the group that has downward causal influence on the members. How else can we account for the behavior of the amoeba known as Dictyostelium?
Normally, this single-celled organism goes about its quiet business of hunting down, engulfing and digesting bacteria that live
in soil. After gorging itself sufficiently, Dictyostelium divides in
two, and the new pair go their separate, bacteria-devouring ways.
But if the thousands of Dictyosteliwn in a stamp-sized plot of
soil should eat their surround ings clean, they do something
exceptional. . ..
Rathet- than crawling around randomly, the amoebas start
streaming toward one another in inwardly pulsing ripples. As
many as 100,000 converge in a swirling mound. And then, remarkably, the mound itself begins to act as if it were the organism. It
stretches out into a bullet-shaped slug the siz of a sand grain
and begins to move. It slithers up toward the surface of the soil,
probes specks of dirt, and turns around when it hits a dead end.
Its movements are slow- it wou ld need a day to travel an inchbut ... the deliberateness of the movements eerily evoke an it
rather than a they. 7

Apparently, each Dictyostelium is able to take orders [Tom the
~Ystem of amoebas as a whole. To put it differently, the organ-

form a group that attains something akin to group cons .
CJousness. Whatever the mechanism, the group appears able
to i~fluence its members by the transfer of information without
~IHch a given amoeba is unable to tell the difference between a
~calized food shortage and a regional famine. Notice that the
~JrecLion of influence in this case is from the group t? its mem. ers, or from the top down. This downward causatwn has an
1111
Portant correlate for human behavior 8
Imagine that you are the dean of students at a small Mid~estern religious university and are leading an investigation into
~ e suicide_ of a twenty-on~-year-old white female student,_ Jane
_oe. Relatives and acquamtances of all sorts have been mterVIewed for clues that might shed light on Jane Doe's choice to
e~d her young life. The jigsaw puzzle of her life begins to take
~ ape: the normally hard-working Jane had recently losl her job
ecause she was unable to stay on task; her academic perform-

15111S
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ance had suffered, with grades falling steadily over a six-month
period; and a long-standing romantic relationship had soured,
leaving Jane listless and depressed. And, oh yes, an autopsy
showed that Jane had an unusually low ionic lithium concentration in her bloodstream-a condition typically associated
with one form of manic depression.
Now, if asked to identify which of these was the real reason
Jane committed suicide, the modern analyst would unhesitatingly point to the chemical deficiency as the root cause of Jane's
behavior, on the assumption that Jane is nothing but the sum of
her chemicals. But contemporary thinkers are unwilling to be
so dismissive of what is a more complicated cluster of reasons
each of which may have contributed to Jane's behavior. So, for
example, one thinker might justifiably answer the question,
"Why did Jane commit suicide?" by responding, "Because she
was Protestant!"
How can this be? In 1897 Emile Durkheim, the father of sociology, published his finding that suicide rates vary according to
victims' social groupingsY Protestants had higher suicide rates
than Roman Catholics; city dwellers had a higher suicide incidence than their rural counterparts; and civilians were more
likely to commit suicide than military personnel. Durkheim reasoned that groups displayed properties that individuals could
not possess on their own. This is not unreasonable: a single H 2 0
molecule cannot display the property of wetness because more
than one molecule is required to establish the surface tension
considered characteristic of that we experience as wetness. Similarly, a single individual living in isolation cannot display the
property of social cohesiveness. Durkheim hypothesized that
groups vary according to levels of social cohesiveness . Some
groups have a high degree of cohesion because members have
internalized a strong normative framework closely tied with the
group's identity- family obligations among Italians, religious
duty among Roman Catholics, nationalist ideals among Shiite
Muslims. Such nonnative frameworks possessed by the group
and ingested by members make members resistant to suicide.
Durkheim's study of suicide is but one example of the way we
are beginning to understand that groups achieve a certain level
of reality. Properties emerge at the level of the group that can
be neither reduced to those operating at the level of the indi-
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vidual nor completely expla ined on ly in terms of individuals.
Moreover, the group as an ordered whole exerts a top-down
influence o n the individual members by virtue of th ese emergent group properties. Consequently, even the hardest of the sciences are, albeit reluctantly, beginning to admit that no one discipline has priority over the others; multiple levels of explanatio n
are required because real causal influence emerges and operate at all levels of complexity.
. Of course, it is relatively easy for us to admit that a chemical
Jmbalance may cause aberrant behavior. But it takes much more
to convi nce us that the reverse is a! o true: behavior alters brain
chemistry. 10 In recent phil osophical parlance, this more co mPlicated picture of things is called metaphysical holism: a group
may be more than the sum of its individual parts. In such cases,
the group itself is causally real, influencing members from the
top down.
Ironically, the notion of metaphysical holism is not a newfangled thing, but a very old concept th at was lost sight of in the
modern period. When the New Testament speaks of "the Body
~f Christ," the corporate filling of the Spirit, and the corporate
new man," or di sapprovingly of "the Law" 11 and "principalities
and powers,'' 12it is acknowledging powers tha t are inextricably
b?und up with co mmunity life and that hold sway over the indiVldual.1 3To anticipate a topi c I wi ll take up in more detail la ter,
We can at leas t provisionally conclud e that faithf-u lness .in
eva ngelism must simultaneo us ly attend to both th e group and
tl:e individual. But before we consider evangelism, we must conSider two other ways modernity i becomin g antiquated.

Language Constitutes the World
A second way in which co ntemporary thinking is leaving th e
conceptual space of modernity i by acknowledging the way that
language co nstitutes the world.
The urgency modern thinkers feel for doing analysis misleads
them: they try to understand the mechanism of language by miscons truin g language as one thing and th e world as another, a nd
then investigating the relation hip between the two. The nearly
21
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unanimous conclusion of this approach has been that language
simply pictures the world.
This strategy is flawed fTom the outset. What does it mean to
treat language in isolation from the world and the world in isolation from language when we think by means oflanguage? I
cannot treat the world in isolation [Tom language because it is
by means of language that I treat anything at all.
Consider: it is tempting to assume that the mind operates like
some sort of digital camera that stores a staggering number of
(Teeze-(Tame snapshots as we proceed through a day. Such snapshots are thought to h, in principle at least, available for recall
and review by the adequately trained brain. A verbal description of the image is thought to be a secondary, add-on step in
the processing of sensory data. However, as Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, an astonishingly high percentage of our mental
life cannot be accomplished m erely by sequences of images. For
example, try thinking I expect it to stop raining soon without
using words. We can conjure images of it raining and then not
raining. But what would an image of "expectation" or "soonness" look like? That an expectation can be about an imminent
state of affairs that may or may not come to pass (it may rain
for another week!) is central to the meaning of this sentence. As
it turns out, words such as "expect" and "soon" are not incidental
add-ons to fundamentally image-based mental processing.
Rather, we cannot catch the principle drift of the sentence without using these very words because language is the means by
which we thin.lc. 14
We can also get an inkling that the modern approach may be
deeply flawed by noti g that if la nguage were m erely a picture,
it could be learned by pointing and naming. However, Wittgenstein showed that a word can be defined by pointing to something only when the overall role of the word in th e language is
already clear. 15
Suppose, however, so meone were Lo object: "It is nol true that
you must already be master of a language in order to understand
an ostensive definition: all you need-of course!- is to know or
guess what th e person giving the explanation is pointin g to . That
is, whether for exa mple to the shape of the object, or to its color,
or to its number, and so on."
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Wittgenstein answers his imaginary interlocutor: "And what
does 'pointing to the shape', 'pointing to the color' consist in?
~oint to a piece of paper.-And now point to its shape-now to
Its color-now to its number (that sounds queer).-How did you
do it?" 16 Because the same gesture in each instance is intended
to pick out vastly different aspects (shape, color, number, and
so on), pointing cannot be the basis by which a nonspeake
acquire fluency in language, especially his or her first language.
One of my earliest memories is of an event that occurred
when I was too young to have mastered the names of the primary colors. I recall my friends teasing me for not knowing my
colors. I must have insi ted otherwise because one of them
~h irped, "Oh yeah, then what is this?" while pointing on a page
a coloring book. "Th at," she cried triumphantly, "is ~e ll ow!"
· Went home very confl.1sed because I knew she had pomted to
a pear. I could not understand her gesture of pointing until I
Understood how to use the words color and, in particular, yello w m
· English sentences.
~hildren initially learn a language not by having objects
P0111ted out to them-that game comes very much la ter-but by
~eing trained into a form or life. All of us share primitive reactions-we squint at bright lights, we pucker when we suck
lemons, and so on. Wittgenstein calls these behaviors primitive
r~actions in order to emphasize their givenness for the funcltoning of language. One way (and only one way) to think of the
~onnection between primitive reactions and language use is to
1111
agine language as going proxy for these other behaviors.

t

How do words refer to sensations? ... Here is one possi bility:
Words are connected with th e primitive, th e natural , express ions
of the sensa tion and used in their place. A child has hurl himself
and he erie ; and then adults talk to him and leach him exclall1ations and, later, sentences. Th ey teach the child new painbehavior.
"S o you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces cry in g and
does not describe itY

Wittgenstein's point is that language doesn't refer to, or picUre, or co rre pond to, or depict some nonlinguistic reality; there

1
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is no way for us to im ag ine that to which language corresponds
("a sta te of affairs," "the world," "reality," etc.) except in terms
of the very language that this "reality" is supposed to be co nsidered in isolation from. Rath er, learning a language is an irreducibly social enterprise th at trains a child into a comm unal
mod e of living. 18 Thus Wittgenstein likens language to a series
of games that require partners for playing: "In a conversation:
One person throws a ball; th e other does not know: whether he
is supposed to throw it back, or throw it to a third person, or
leave it on the ground , or pick it up an d put it in his pocket,
etc." 19 Language is n o t a picture t ha t s uccumbs to distanced
observation, it is a socially involved enterprise that by its very
na ture engages human subjec ts.
We now can see why a nother radical critic of modernity, John
L. Austin, describes language as "performative." 20 Language is
a form of action that ge ts work don e. Think of the vast array of
ways in which language performs work: we make promises, we
ask qu estions, we give orders, we make confessions. When I
spoke th e words "I do !" to Jea nne L. Dahle, I didn't describe
som e state of affairs-! chan ged forever both h er world a nd
min e. With and through those words I beca me h er hu s band .
More ominously, now that we have children, we are painfu lly
aware of the power of la nguage to nurture or denature our three
chi ldren, who inhabit a world of either praise or verbal abuse.
Thus, philosophy has challenged so me long-standing assumption about language. Before I show th ese recent vi ws' significa nce for doing ministry, let me introduce one more way contemporary thinking is leavi ng mod ernity behind.

The Shifting of Paradigms
Nicolaus Copernicus was a Poli sh astronomer whose posthumous publication with th e snap py ti tie On the Revolution of the
Celestial Orbs (1543) turned th e world on its h ead. Copernicus
used geom etry to argue that, co ntrary to common thinking, the
Earth revolved around the sun in a regu lar orbit. By 1610
Galileo Galilei had begun publishing observations of the h eavens that he had made by means of his telescope. These obser24
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v~tions corro borated Copernic us's h eliocentric model. Despite
VIolent opposition from th e chu rch, multitudes of thinking people were converted to the view tha t we inhabit a solar sys tem,
With th e sun at its center, ra th er than a geocentric, o r Earthcentered, uni verse.
We mus t unders ta nd th a t th e stakes for such a conversion
Were hi gh. As tronom y was not simply a hobby for those who
had the money and leisure to gaze heavenward. Ch arting th e
stars was critical for naviga ting Earth's oceans, and kn owledge
?fthe heavenly seasons was integral to skillfully timing the plantIng and harvesting of crops. And for thousa nds of years, the
Earth-centered model of the Egypti an as tron om er Ptolemy had
g~nerated exceptionally accura te sta r charts and calendars . To
give up this sys tem surely could be done ra tionally only on the
basis of improved char ts and calendar . Ri ght? Wrong! The real
Puzzle surrounding the mass conversion to the Copernican view
Was the fac t that empirical data, such as those improved charts
and calendars, lagged behind the Ptolemai c sys tem by nearl y
t~o hundred years!2 1 We norm ally say tha t when we change our
n1ll1ds, we did so on the bas is of solid evid ence. How can we
account for this mys tery ?
In 1951 W. V. 0. Quine shocked the philosophical world with
the sugges tion tha t beliefs are as social as they are rational.
The to ta lity of o ur so-ca lled knowl edge or belief , fl·om the mos t
casual m a tters of geography and history to th e profoundest laws
of a to mi c physics or eve n o f pure ma the ma tics and log ic, is a
man-made fa bric whi ch impinges o n experience o nJy alo ng the
edges .... But the total fi e ld is so unde termined by its bounda ry
conditi o ns, expe rience, tha t th ere is mu ch la ti tud e of choice as
to wha t s ta te me nts to re-evalu a te in the light of a ny s ingle con trary experi ence. No pa l-ti cular experiences are linked with a ny
Pa rtic ular sta tem ents in the interior o f the fi el d, except indi rec tly
throug h co nsid e ra ti ons o f equilibrium affec tin g the fi eld as a
whole. 22

shc~uine s uggest ed tha t we underst~nd hun?an beliefs ~s the
l at eel property of a hum an comm umty.23 Behefs form an mterb~C~ing se ~; each b l~ef h a~ a s.take in th e reli a bility of neighn ng behe fs. Expen ence 1mpmges only on the set as a wh ole
25
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by being the "boundary condition" of the web. Experience may
indeed conflict with beliefs, but in such cases, the conflict is not
between an isolated belief and a single datum of experience.
Rather, experience as a whole may generate dissonance within
the entire web. As tension mounts, the community rushes to
reestablish equilibrium by a variety of strategies.
To put it differently, beliefs differ h·om each other only by
virtue of their distance from the periphery of experience. Those
beliefs that lie near the periphery are more public and more
open to change. Those beliefs that are more deeply ingressed
are more impervious to change. One can imagine that central
beliefs are hedged in by a buffer of more peripheral beliefs. Ten·
sion may be resolved by one of three strategies, any of which
may be reasonable.
First, the recalcitrant data may simply be ignored. Scientists
regularly suspend final judgment on puzzling experiment results
when these results seem to undermine reigning scientific views.
For example, scattered reports of experiments in which nuclear
fusion is achieved at room temperature will continue to be
treated with suspicion precisely because the possibility of cold
fusion runs against the grain of contemporary theoretical
physics. Two facts make the current web of beliefs very resilient
to change: first, too much has been invested (time, research dollars, textbook production, etc.) to scrap it all on the basis of one
or two anomalies; second, the reigning web of beliefs has a vastly
greater success rate at explaining hundreds of thousands of
experimental data than any yet-to-be-formulated replacement
created to account for the single puzzling anomaly. Thus, one
reasonable response is to adopt a wait-and-see attitude in anticipation that some fertile minds may eventually concoct ways lO
understand present anomalies within the spectrum of currentlY
available theories. And, as the history of science bears out, in
most cases such a resolution presents itself.
Second, sometimes tension may be resolved by inventing a
belief that mollifies the tension by realigning the web. Consider
a theological example. Early Christians clearly believed that ( 1)
Jesus was to be worshiped as God, (2) God was one, and (3) Jesus
and God were distinct. It didn't take long for detractors to object
that these beliefs constituted a logical contradiction. Of course,
the problem would dissolve if Christians were willing simply to
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jettison one of these three beliefs, but too much was at stake.
Denial of Christ's deity is the subordinationist heresy practiced
by the Arians. Denial of the unity of God would be tantamount
t? polytheism (or literally, bi- or tritheism). Denial of the distmction between Jesus and the Father winds up in the heresy
called modalism . In order to retain all three beliefs, Christians
constructed the doctrine of the Trinity, which relieved the ten-·
s!on. The deity of Christ, the singularity of God, and the distinctiveness of the Father and the Son were each intelligible
When viewed under the concept aspect of the Trinity.
Does this mean that the Trinity is just a fiction because it was
an invention of the believing community? This question is
wrongheaded. Let me illustrate with an example from the world
of engineering. Bridges are always in danger of collapsing
because winds and traffic set them vibrating like guitar strings.
If the vibrations resonate-a phenomenon in which the amplitude, or strength, of the vibration surges because it matches the
natural wavelength of the span of the bridge-the bridge is in
danger of collapsing. To avoid catastrophe, bridge designers
~ust estimate this danger by solving what are called wave equations for the bridge. If the solution to the wave equation turns
o~t to be a certain imaginary number (such as .J~), the bridge
~Ill not collapse from vibrational stresses. Yet imaginary numers are so called because they cannot be located anywhere on
the real number line. Does this make them simply fictitious? Of
course not. Imaginary numbers are real in the sense that they
are shorthand accounts of safe bridges. Similarly, the concept
of the Trinity is a shorthand reminder of safe ways we need to
travel when speaking about God. To speak about God in any
Other way will land us in heresy.
Third, tension in the web resulting [TOm the web's inability
~~ recon_cile itself to recalcitra~t experien~e_may eventually tear
e fabnc of the web . When this sort of cnSIS occurs, a large set
~r ~u bset of beliefs may be supplanted by an?ther "'et altoget~er.
s~Is wholesale exch~nge of belief s:stems IS called a ~aradtgm
. ft. Because swappmg takes place m blockhouse fashwn, there
~not usually a smooth transition from one paradigm to another.
Wather, the t:an~itio_n is like a Gestalt s"':'itch . For e~ample, most
esterners mstmct1vely see the followmg figure m one of two
Ways: as a three dimensional box coming toward and down to
27
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the left of the viewer or as one coming toward them but up to
the right. Once a viewer fixates on one of these aspects, she can
force herself to see it under the other aspect. However, when
this change of aspect dawns, it happens all at once; the figure
doesn't morph from one aspect to the other-it leaps.

Similarly, when a paradigm is in crisis, the shift to a new paradigm is very rapid and has naturally been described as "a conversion."24 However, unlike a Gestalt switch, a paradigm shift
generally is not reversible; once the new paradigm is in place,
the old way of viewing things is no longer convincing.
On the other hand, because data gain significance only by
virtue of their appropriation and interpretation by a conceptual
scheme (a paradigm is the means by which we interpret data as
data), 25 the shifting of paradigms cannot be driven by data alone.
Thomas Kuhn explains:
The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must
often do so in defiance of the ev idence provided by problemsolving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will
succeed with the many large problems that confTont it, knowing
on ly that the older paradigm has failed with a few . A decision of
that kind can only be made on faith .26

Thus, the swapping of paradigms is reasonable-we have epistemic permission to shop around once our old paradigm is in
crisis-but it is never, strictly speaking, compelled by the data
for which the new paradigm provides a radically different
(incommensurable) interpretationY We can now appreciate the
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ambiguity facing early admirers of Copernicus. Copernicus's
feometry seemed to make sense, but Ptolemy's model produced
tt that tim e) more accurate calendars. So, what was one to do?
d~ Kuhn's words, those who converted to the Copernican model
ld so on the basis of faith.

Summary

By and large, the differences between the received modernist
account of reality and that offered by recent postmodern upstarts
~~so great that it is natural for postmodern (or postcritical)
~h1_nkers to s~eak of their own work as c?nstituting ~ par~digm
. lft. I have d1scussed three aspects of this new parad1gm m par~;cular. Fir~~' _metaphysical holis_m. is the view that ~r~ups ? ehave
hke real entities that both constitute each members 1dent1ty and
ave top-down causal influence on them. Hence, we are socially
c~nstituted critters. Second, language accounts for the lion's
s are of our social make-up (linguistic holism); language is the
means by which we think and act in the world. Language can~ot be pried off the world of experience and analyzed in isolatJ~n because the conceptual la nguage we think and speak deter~lnes th e sh ape of the world we inhabit. Third, the beliefs we
thld_about our world form an interlocking set that we share with_
be~· res t of our c_omn~unity (ep~s.tem.ological_holism )._ This set of
B lefs, or paradigm, JS very res1hent and typically res1sts change.
llt when change comes, it comes all at once.
e Although th ese new habits of speakin g cannot be easily
hXplained (especially in terms of the modern parad igm), they
~ve direct implications for understanding evangelism and religious conversion. Let's tackle conversion first.
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